Ex Nihilo in Mundum : A Reply to Paipais by Prozorov, Sergei
1 
 
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Millennium : journal of 
international studies, vol. 45, issue 1. The final authenticated version is available online at: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829816630080. 
 
Sergei Prozorov 
 
 
EX NIHILO IN MUNDUM: A REPLY TO PAIPAIS 
 
 
I am thankful to Vassilios Paipais for his incisive and stimulating review of my Void Universalism 
books, which not only succeeded in succinctly addressing the key issues raised in the two books 
but also launched what l very much hope will be a wider debate about the relation between 
ontology and world politics. In this response I will address two main points of my disagreement 
with Paipais. The first concerns the possibility of deriving universalist axioms of world politics from 
the ontology of the void discussed in the first volume, Ontology and World Politics (OWP), while 
the second pertains to the limitations on the world-political subject addressed in the second 
volume, Theory of the Political Subject (TPS). While Paipais’s reading of my work is as attentive and 
generous as an author could hope for, it is grounded in quite a different perspective on the 
ontology of politics and it is these differences that I would like to accentuate and elaborate on in 
this response. 
 
Let us begin with the question of the content of universalist world politics. Whereas the main 
ambition of my project is to derive universal political axioms from the ontology of the void, Paipais 
concurs with this ontology but rejects the possibility of any such derivation: ‘Nothing authorizes 
the production of any content, no matter how axiomatic, prior to its mediation through positive 
political orders’. In OWP I discussed such a stance, which characterizes a variety of post-
Heideggerian and Lacanian approaches in continental political thought, as meta-political. In my 
reading, meta-politics affirms the void as the condition of possibility of all positive worlds, yet also 
posits it as the condition of impossibility of any political content transcending these positive 
worlds. As a result, the only form world politics  could take is a radical pluralism with no possibility 
of adjudicating between a plurality of particular worlds . In my view, such a disposition is overly 
pessimistic about the possibility of universalist politics, or perhaps betrays its scepticism or unease 
about it in the guise of the claim for its impossibility. While it is evident that the void itself could 
not possibly authorize the derivation of any content (or, which amounts to the same thing, would 
authorize the derivation of any content whatsoever), its entry into positive worlds in the 
disposition I term being-in-the-World (exemplified by Heidegger’s anxiety, boredom or any other 
fundamental moods) provides us with a mode of being exhausted in being itself, a worldly being 
subtracted from all positive predicates and exposed as ‘whatever’ it is. It is important to insist that 
being-in-the-World is not a regulative idea, a transcendental principle, a deferred presence or a 
fundamental fantasy, but a patently real, phenomenologically accessible condition: surely, every 
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one of us must have been bored or anxious more than a few times. In this condition, the world 
and the World as void come together in their difference, yet, contrary to Paipais, what is produced 
in this difference is not nothingness or lack, but ourselves, beings in their being, taken up in our 
inconsistent multiplicity. It is the attributes of this condition that constitute the axioms of world 
politics: freedom, equality and community, understood as what remains when worldly beings are 
subtracted from their positive identities.  
 
Thus, universal political content certainly emerges in positive political orders, but rather than 
being mediated by them, it is a result of subtraction from them. Most importantly, the axioms of 
world politics do not serve to conceal or compensate for the void at the heart of the world, as 
Paipais seems to suggest, but rather consist in its very exposure. Freedom, equality and 
community do nothing but name the not-all of every world, restoring the void as its condition of 
possibility. In this manner, the positive world is brought into a relation with the void of the World 
from which it emerges, or, in Paipais’s terminology, politics is brought into a relation with the 
political. While the two sets of terms appear symmetrical, there is actually an important difference 
between them that helps pinpoint my divergence from Paipais. The World as void cannot really be 
equated with ‘the political’ in any meaningful sense: there is nothing political in the void, because 
there is nothing at all there. This is why I do not see any use for the notion of ‘political difference’ 
akin to the ontological difference: there is only politics and it only takes place within positive 
worlds, but it does so by traversing the void of the World whereby a worldly being appears solely 
in its being. While ‘the political-politics’ distinction tends to downgrade politics as merely ontic 
and elevate the political as somehow ontological, for me politics only makes sense as the 
movement from the ontic to the ontological and back again, the transformation of the world on 
the basis of the axioms derived from the appearance of the void of the World within it. It is 
precisely because the World really appears in the world that politics ends up with the ontological 
content of its own and the difference between politics and the political ends up annulled. If no 
such content were available, this difference would have remained insurmountable and yet also 
insignificant, since the ontic realm of politics would have been wholly sequestered from the 
ontological dimension. It is this separation that has resulted in the failure to think political 
universalism otherwise than as hegemony of particularism and overcoming this separation has 
been the main impetus for my book.  
 
In Paipais’s view, my attempt at such overcoming fails and this failure is not contingent but 
necessary. His verdict is framed in Lacanian terms: my attempt to derive universalist content from 
void ontology apparently demonstrates my sticking to the fantasy of emancipatory and egalitarian 
world politics, failing to come to terms with its fundamental impossibility. Clamouring for 
universals as ‘lost objects’ apparently entails that I remain on the level of desire, failing to move to 
the register of the drive, which is instead marked by the recognition of ‘redoubled loss without 
reciprocity or consolation, constantly encircling the empty place, the void that remains inscrutable 
and indiscernible.’ Now, we all know that denial is really of no use when dealing with 
psychoanalysis, since it only serves to reinforce the original diagnosis. I would therefore readily 
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accept remaining on the level of desire, the desire to go beyond the impasse of the meta-political 
discourse that affirms the void without recognizing any affirmative consequences of its eruption 
for positive worlds. In fact, I find this level to be rather more agreeable that the level of the drive 
as Paipais describes it, if only because the tragic pathos of ‘loss without reciprocity or consolation’ 
seems to me to be somewhat contrived. Instead, there is a clear surplus enjoyment in the fact that 
every affirmation may be revealed as naïve and misguided in its disavowal of a more fundamental 
impossibility, still stuck in the fantasy that the braver souls among us have already traversed to our 
advantage. In this sense, metapolitics reveals an uncanny similarity to political realism, which 
similarly insists on the need to come to terms with the uncomfortable truth of there being no 
universals. Yet, if something is uncomfortable, this does not necessarily make it true, and the 
limits of meta-politics appear to me to be entirely self-imposed: the impossibility of the affirmative 
passage from the World to worlds appears to be more a matter of prohibition, a call for the 
renunciation of desire or its redirection towards more legitimate, attainable or healthy objects. 
Moreover, I am not entirely sure about what gains a politics constituted by such a prohibition is 
expected to achieve, since its anti-utopianism does not leave us with much more than a resigned 
fidelity to the void itself, rather than its axiomatic consequences. For Paipais, the derivation of any 
content from void ontology is an illegitimate move that ‘seeks to tame [its] destructive potential’. 
Yet, I do not see any such potential in the void ontology as such. The void itself is simply the void, 
from which, as we know, nihil fit. Fidelity to this void certainly enables the contestation of false, 
hegemonic universalisms as always already doomed attempts to cover up or fill this void, yet 
leaves us powerless when it comes to contesting particular worldly orders, which are all equally 
contingent emanations of/from the void. Rather than tame the ferocious force of void ontology, I 
venture to amplify the force of what, in a meta-political reading, is a tame position indeed. The 
political axioms derived from void ontology are, when affirmed to a maximal degree, inevitably 
subversive of and even destructive for positive worldly orders, exposing them to the 
indeterminate and hence in principle inexhaustible affirmation of freedom, equality and 
community.  
 
Yet, could all of this be a fantasy? Are the affirmative effects of these axioms paradigmatic ‘lost 
objects’ (of presence, fullness, completeness) whose unavailability to us we must come to terms 
with in the ethics of psychoanalysis? I do not think so. Emancipatory movements, egalitarian 
legislation, communitarian practices are not lost but rather ‘found’ (invented or discovered) 
objects, which are ontically familiar to us all even if their ontological status remains undecided. 
This is an important point I would like to emphasize. I do not have the slightest interest in 
developing some new, hitherto unimagined form of politics, but rather attempt to provide an 
ontological account of the instances of universalist political affirmation recurring throughout 
history: from the great revolutions of modernity to civil rights campaigns, from anti-apartheid 
struggles to anti-globalization movements, from the Arab Spring to Euromaidan. While these and 
other events may have eventually been subsumed under the orders of the worlds in which they 
unfolded, at the moment of their eruption they undeniably transcended these worlds , subverting 
their immanent orders with the affirmation of freedom, equality and community that as such have 
4 
 
no other basis aside from the facticity of the being of all beings. It is therefore not a matter of 
deploying ontology for making up a new politics but of giving an ontological account of the 
political events that have taken place from time immemorial and which keep taking place today, 
often against all odds, miraculously transcending the worldly coordinates of the possible. Yet, if 
this transcendence appears miraculous, it is precisely because it disrupts the fantasy of one’s 
world as all-there-is, revealing it as not-all. The traversal of the void in world-political practices is 
therefore resonant, if not exactly equivalent, with the idea of the traversal of the fantasy in 
psychoanalysis, with the caveat that in my approach the ontology of the void has nothing to do 
with loss or lack but rather leads to the affirmation of universalist political practices that, however 
rare and transient, are decidedly real. 
 
Let us now proceed to the pathway of the world-political subject, outlined in the second volume of 
Void Universalism. Paipais argues that my view of world politics is simultaneously extreme (in its 
rejection of reformism and compromise) and unduly moderate (in its call for restraint in affirming 
political axioms in various worlds). I am largely in agreement with this assessment, even though, as 
I will show in what follows, it hardly amounts to a contradiction, since the ‘extreme’ and 
‘moderate’ orientations pertain to entirely different things. The axiomatic content of politics 
cannot be compromised without world politics losing its universalist character and becoming 
subsumed under the particular order of the world: we all know how originally political movements 
such as liberalism and socialism, which in their own different ways, challenged the existing worlds 
through affirmation of universalism, often became means of maintaining the particular orders of 
these worlds against other political challengers. In order not to be subsumed under intra-worldly 
governmental rationalities, world politics must affirm its axioms to the maximal degree, which 
does not necessarily exclude reformism and compromise, if such maximal affirmation can be 
attained through them, which I do not in principle exclude. When it comes to the content of 
politics, my stance is indeed prescriptive. 
Yet, given the infinite number of positive worlds, whether and how to act politically in a given 
world are entirely different questions and here any prescriptive orientation would obviously be a 
tall order. While void ontology prescribes what it would mean to act politically in any given world, 
it could not possibly authorize an injunction to do so in any world whatsoever, let alone in all 
worlds, since the notion of the world of all worlds is ontologically inconsistent. Any prescription to 
act politically in any and all worlds could only be based on the desire to transform the world in 
accordance with its ontological condition of possibility, i.e. create a world corresponding to the 
World. Yet, the ontology of the void obviously renders every such attempt meaningless: to desire 
to produce the World in the world is to reduce the existing world to the void, make nothing out of 
something.1 This form of active nihilism must be rigorously distinguished from the transformative 
objectives of world politics, which in contrast makes something out of nothing and can do so in 
any world whatsoever, without these effects ever becoming totalizable into something like a 
                                                                 
1I address a particularly violent form of this nihil istic politics in my Biopolitics of Stalinism: Ideology and Life in Soviet 
Socialism (Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 
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‘perfect world’, the very drive for which is the worst temptation political thought could possibly 
yield to.   
Yet, neither does void ontology authorize an injunction against the politicization of any particular 
world, hence it is not entirely correct that my approach necessarily calls for prudence or 
limitations. In fact, the greater part of TPS is devoted to demonstrating that the process of political 
affirmation encounters no limitation, be it ethical, epistemic or functional. Yet, precisely for this 
reason the freedom of the subject to politicize a world is simultaneously a freedom not to 
politicize it, to refrain from the production of the effects of the axioms of the World in the world 
without thereby negating these axioms themselves. It is easy to think of examples where a 
maximal affirmation of freedom, equality and community would be deemed undesirable, from 
endowing toddlers with voting rights to legislating the equality of all statements in science or of all 
works of art. It is also easy to understand the appeal of grounding this undesirability ontologically. 
Yet, in these and other cases it is impossible to infer a decision to politicize a world (or not)  from 
the ontology of the void that is indifferent to particular worlds. While both moderate and radical 
political ideologies delude themselves and their supporters as being necessarily in the right, as if 
being itself was on their side, ontology neither prescribes nor proscribes politicization, hence both 
of these positions have equal ontological status, i.e. none whatsoever. This is why despite the 
sameness of its axiomatic content world politics displays remarkable intra-worldly variations: 
whether to politicize a world and how to politicize it remain strictly ontic questions with no 
foundation in void ontology. In short, while the content of politics is unconditional, its scope or 
form are not and remain up to the subject. 
Paipais interprets this position in line with Arendt’s late work on judgment and argues that this 
stance is entirely contrary to Badiou who is otherwise the key influence on my approach. Yet, even 
though fidelity to Badiou is not among my top priorities, I believe that my notion of world politics 
largely accords with Paipais’s definition of Badiou’s politics as a ‘militant subjectivising truth 
process that prioritises fidelity to an unnameable Event’, especially if we supplement the technical 
term ‘truth’ with a more generic ‘affirmation’ and define the event in terms of the appearance of 
the World in the world. My three axioms of world politics, which in addition to Badiou’s equality 
also include freedom and community that he rejected (for no good reason!), operate in much the 
same way as subjectivising operators affirmed through practices of fidelity that are militant at 
least in the maximalism of their content, if not the extremism of their form. However, whereas 
Badiou’s ethics makes no distinction between the fidelity to ontological axioms (truths) and the 
production of their effects in actual worlds (perhaps because his theory of worlds was not fully 
developed at the time when this ethics was elaborated), I would insist on this distinction. There is 
no contradiction between affirming the validity of the axioms of freedom, equality and community 
in any world whatsoever (and hence refrain from negating them in a reactive or obscure manner) 
and exempting any number of worlds from the production of the effects of these axioms , whereby 
the latter figure in these worlds as literally ineffective. While Arendt’s judgment is certainly 
inapplicable to the former action (by virtue of the axiomatic status of political content), it might 
well be one of the modes, in which the subject decides to politicize or not to politicize a given 
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world. Indeed, in the absence of a universal rule concerning the politicization of all worlds, 
Arendt’s version of Kant’s reflective judgment is certainly an applicable tool for deciding on the 
specific pathway of political subjectivation, along with various other forms of practical reasoning. 
Badiou may well be hostile to Arendt’s judgment when it pertains to the content of political 
affirmation, but whether he would reject its application to the decision that launches such an 
affirmation is a different question altogether. After all, despite Badiou’s well-known ethical 
valorization of militancy, his theory is rather more refined than a call for the politicization of every 
world, if only because, for Badiou, there are other types of truth besides political ones and he is all 
too aware how scientific, artistic and amorous truths  may be damaged or destroyed by the pursuit 
of political truths and, of course, the other way round.  
 
[Badiou] never puts forward an operator of hierarchization among the four truth 
procedures, which, if we think about it, implies a thesis of singular radicality, truly 
uncommon. In the strict sense, for Badiou, a simple love story between two 
individuals is a truth in the same way as the French Revolution in its totality, or the 
theory of General Relativity. Nothing allows us to impart a superior dignity to events 
that involve a whole nation or a whole science, in relation to the event of an 
amorous encounter that merely involves two beings. This is why the ethics of truths 
never allows us to decide for certain what must be selected in a situation; each is 
here sent back to his responsibility as a plural subject, capable of multiple and 
ultimately conflictual truths. How to decide between the exigency of political 
violence, which is ultimately legitimate in certain circumstances, and the incalculable 
destruction of amorous relations, scientific inventions and artistic creations that this 
violence risks occasioning? The choice of a subject cannot be guaranteed by any law, 
any algorithm of the decision: love or revolution, austere theory or furious avant-
garde, the individual is often convoked by divergent truths, and no one can replace 
its choices here and now between heterogeneous subjectivations. (Meillassoux 2014: 
34)2 
 
While there is an ethical injunction to truth and the axiomatic prescription of its content in 
Badiou’s work, there is neither an injunction nor a prescription that would help one decide which 
truth to affirm, i.e. whether to opt for the politicization of a given world or the pursuit of scientific, 
artistic or amorous truths in it. Thus, even from the perspective of an unconditional injunction to 
truths in general there cannot be anything like a universal demand for universal politicization, only 
the demand that politicization, if and when it takes place, is indeed universal(ist).  While I part 
ways with Badiou on a host of other issues, I am entirely in agreement on this one. While void 
ontology demonstrates the existence of universal axioms of politics, it says precious little not only 
about whether to apply those axioms in a given world but also about how they ought to be 
applied, what worldly form political affirmation must take. Thus, while I might be ‘purist’ about 
the degree of affirmation of political axioms, I am happily agnostic about the appropriate forms of 
                                                                 
2Quention Meillassoux ‘Decision and Undecidability of the Event in Being and Event I and II’, Parrhesia 19, 22-35. 
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politics, which depend entirely on the context as well as the attributes of political subjects in 
question. This is why, for example, I neither have a quarrel with messianism, as Paipais appears to 
suggest, nor assign it any kind of privilege. Political messianism, be it Pauline, Benjaminian or 
Agambenian, is for me not an ontological standpoint (if only because there is nothing messianic in 
being, and the Messiah, whatever it is, is without being by definition) but a subjective disposition 
or a strategy that might or might not work in the world in question. In my Ethics of 
Postcommunism (Palgrave, 2009) I analysed both its relatively successful application in the late-
Soviet period, when a quasi-messianic disengagement from the world brought the dreary and 
degraded system down in a relatively peaceful way, and its problematic position amid the ruins of 
the postcommunist period, where social order survived in the obscene form of the general state of 
exception. Judging by this and other examples, I would suggest that messianic politics only 
succeeds when it is animated by the sense of the imminent end of the order in question: while in 
our secular age one might be tempted to extract the logic of messianism from every eschatology 
and apocalypticism, this solution does not really work, since, as Jacob Taubes once argued, the 
messianic disengagement from the world only makes sense if one truly believes that the world in 
question is on its way out anyway.3 If the end of the present order of things is indeed near, then 
the suspension of one’s participation in it is not only ethically justified but also makes a lot of 
practical sense. This is why messianic theories marked by such a sense of the imminent end 
(Benjamin, Agamben) are far more convincing that those that reject all ‘apocalyptic tone’, voiding 
messianism of all messianicity (Derrida). In any case, there need not be a quarrel between 
messianism and what I call ‘actual redemption of the world’: after all, any messianic redemption 
worthy of the name is also actual and never merely potential, even if what it redeems is 
potentiality itself. What matters is that the effects of the ontological axioms are produced in the 
world, which may take place both through disengagement from the existing world order and 
varying degrees of participation in it.  
 
In short, I see no contradiction whatsoever between a ‘purism’ with respect to political content 
and a ‘prudentialism’ with respect to the choice for political action and its preferable form. In 
contrast, such a ‘prudential extremism’ seems to me to be the only safe pathway between the 
Scylla of passive-nihilist renunciation of universalism and the Charybdis of the active-nihilist 
negation of worlds in the name of the void. By refusing to relativize its content, world politics 
ensures, however briefly and tentatively, its radical heterogeneity to intra-worldly government 
that grants its axioms validity in any world whatsoever. Yet, by reserving the possibility to refrain 
from the politicization of any given world, the subject affirms that while the axioms of world 
politics are valid for all there is (including non-human and non-living beings), politics is  not all there 
is, there being other ‘truths’ or, more broadly, affirmative procedures , operative in and indeed 
constitutive of particular worlds, that would be endangered by a radical affirmation of freedom, 
equality and community. In short, there need not be a choice between the ‘ontologization of 
phenomenal politics’ and a ‘politics of realist prudence’ – one can have both, and only by having 
                                                                 
3 Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
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both does ontological universalism become commensurable with ontic pluralism. Traversing the 
infinite number of infinite worlds, the finite political subject individuates itself by deciding on the 
worlds to be transformed in accordance with the universal axioms and the worlds , in which these 
axioms remain valid but not acted upon, ceding priority to a myriad of other possible modes of 
affirmation. This is why despite the fundamental sameness of world-political axioms we continue 
to dwell in an infinite diversity of worlds, periodically ruptured and transformed by infinitely 
diverse political subjects. 
